Doctrine of Essentiality

The Doctrine of Essentiality is a jurisprudential principle formulated by the Supreme Court of India to determine which religious practices qualify as essential and are thereby protected under Article 25 of the Indian Constitution.

This doctrine aims to strike a balance between the freedom of religion and other fundamental rights, ensuring that religious practices do not infringe upon the rights to equality, dignity and liberty.

Defining Essential Religious Practices and the Doctrine of Essentiality

Essential religious practices refer to those customs, rituals and practices that are fundamental to a religion’s core beliefs. Without these practices, a religion would lose its essence and identity. The Doctrine of Essentiality was introduced by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954). In this case, the Court held that the term “religion” encompasses all rituals and practices integral to a religion and it assumed the responsibility of determining which practices are essential.

Conflict Between Fundamental Rights

In a diverse country like India, conflicts often arise between the right to religious freedom and other fundamental rights such as the right to equality and the right to life and personal liberty. The judiciary, through the Doctrine of Essentiality, has played a crucial role in addressing these conflicts.

Key Supreme Court Cases and the Evolution of Doctrine of Essentiality

The doctrine of essential religious practices has evolved significantly over the decades, shaping the legal landscape of religious freedom and its limitations in India.

1954: The Shirur Mutt Case

The ERP doctrine was first articulated in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Shri Lakshmindar Tirtha Swamiyar of Shri Shirur Mutt (1954). In this case, a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the Constitution protects religious practices unless they conflict with public order, health or morality. The Court emphasised that regulation by the state should not interfere with religious practices unless they are economic, commercial or political in nature. The Court rejected the suggestion that only “essential” practices of a religion be given constitutional protection, asserting that the essential nature of a practice must be determined by the religion itself.

1959: Sardar Sarup Singh v State of Punjab

In this case, the Supreme Court applied the ERP doctrine to uphold the constitutionality of Section 148-B of the Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1925. The petitioners argued that this section infringed on Article 26(b) by not allowing direct elections of Gurudwara Board members by the Sikh community. The Court found no authoritative religious text supporting the claim that direct elections were essential to Sikhism, thus upholding the provision.

1961: Durgah Committee, Ajmer v Syed Hussain Ali

This case involved a challenge to the Dargah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955, which allowed all Hanafi Muslims to partake in the shrine’s maintenance, contrary to the claims of exclusivity by the Soofi Chistia Order. The Supreme Court held that only practices considered essential and integral to a religion are protected under Article 26. It ruled that purely secular practices or those arising from superstitious beliefs do not merit constitutional protection.

1962: Sardar Syedna Taher Saiffuddin Saheb v State of Bombay

The Court evaluated whether the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949, violated the Dawoodi Bohra Community’s rights under Articles 25 and 26. The Act restricted the Head Priest’s power of excommunication. The Court upheld the right of the Head Priest, asserting that this power was integral to the religious faith and practices of the community.

1963: Tilkayat Shri Govindlaji Maharaj v State of Rajasthan

In this case, the challenge was against the Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959. The Court ruled that essential practices must be integral to the religion and followed by the community. Secular activities, even if associated with religious practices, could be regulated by statute without infringing constitutional protections.

1972: Seshammal & Ors v State of Tamil Nadu

The Supreme Court addressed the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Amendment) Act, 1970, which regulated the appointment of temple Archakas (priests). The Court held that while the appointment process was secular, the denomination from which Archakas were to be appointed was essential and must adhere to religious texts like the Agamas.

1997: Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi & Ors. v State of UP & Ors

The Court upheld the U.P. Sri Kashi Vishwanath Temple Act, 1983, distinguishing between the temple’s religious and secular functions. The Act regulated only secular aspects, such as administration and management, which were not integral to the practice of the religion.

2004: Commissioner of Police v Acharya Jagadisharananda Avadhuta

In this case, the Court evaluated whether the Tandava Dance was an essential practice of the Ananda Marga faith. Despite the faith’s scriptural injunctions, the Court ruled that the dance was not essential, as its absence would not fundamentally alter the religion.

2016: Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v Government of Tamil Nadu

This case involved a government order abolishing caste-based discrimination in the appointment of temple Archakas. The Court reiterated that while the appointment is a secular function, it must conform to religious texts. However, it also held that religious practices must align with constitutional mandates, including non-discrimination.

Recent Examples of Judicial Use of the Doctrine of Essentiality

Triple Talaq Case (2017)

In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court examined the practice of instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat) in Islam. The Court declared the practice unconstitutional, asserting that it violated the fundamental rights of Muslim women to live with dignity and personal liberty (Articles 14 and 21). The Court held that triple talaq was not an essential religious practice, thereby protecting the rights of women against arbitrary and unilateral divorce.

Sabarimala Case (2018)

In Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the exclusion of women of menstruating age (10-50 years) from entering the Sabarimala temple. The Court ruled that this exclusion was unconstitutional and not an essential practice of the Hindu religion. It upheld the right to equality (Article 14) and the right to freedom of religion subject to morality (Article 25). The decision emphasised that practices which discriminate against women cannot be considered essential.

Karnataka Hijab Case (2022)

In March 2022, the Karnataka High Court ruled on the issue of wearing hijabs in educational institutions. The Court held that wearing a hijab is not an essential religious practice in Islam and that schools are at liberty to prescribe uniforms as a reasonable restriction. This ruling, currently pending appeal in the Supreme Court, aimed to maintain discipline and uniformity in educational institutions while addressing the conflict between the right to education and the right to religious freedom.

Criticism of the Doctrine of Essentiality

While the Doctrine of Essentiality has been pivotal in resolving conflicts between fundamental rights, it has faced substantial criticism on several grounds:

Judicial Competence in Religious Matters

Critics argue that courts, guided by the Constitution and laws, lack the expertise to decide on religious matters. Justice Indu Malhotra, in her dissenting opinion in the Sabarimala case, asserted that questions of religious practices should be left to the religious communities themselves. The judiciary’s intervention in determining what constitutes essential practices can be seen as overstepping its boundaries.

Subjectivity in Religious Practices

Religious practices are often subjective and deeply personal. For a devout person, every religious practice may seem essential, while an atheist might view none as essential. The court’s role in deciding these matters can undermine individual autonomy and the personal nature of religious faith.

Unpredictable and Undesirable Consequences

Application of the Doctrine of Essentiality can lead to unpredictable outcomes. For instance, the Karnataka hijab case might result in the denial of education to women from specific communities, potentially infringing on their right to education. Similarly, in Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that a mosque is not essential to the practice of Islam, leading to conflicts over offering namaz in public places, as seen in Gurgaon.

Lack of Recognition of Intra-religious Diversity

The doctrine often fails to recognise the diversity within the same religion. Different sects and schools of thought within a religion may have varying interpretations of what constitutes essential practices. The judiciary’s broad-brush approach may not accommodate this diversity adequately.

Balancing Religious Freedom and Social Reform

Despite these criticisms, the Doctrine of Essentiality has been instrumental in upholding constitutional morality while delineating the boundaries between secular and religious aspects of society. The judiciary has used this doctrine to protect individual rights and promote social reforms, ensuring that religious practices do not infringe upon the rights and dignity of individuals.

Conclusion

The Doctrine of Essentiality serves as a critical tool for the judiciary to navigate the complex interplay between various fundamental rights. By determining which religious practices are essential, the courts have addressed conflicts between the right to equality, the right to life and personal liberty and the right to religious freedom.

While the doctrine has faced criticism for its subjective and sometimes controversial nature, it remains a vital mechanism for upholding constitutional values and promoting social justice. The judiciary, as a pillar of constitutional morality, continues to play a crucial role in maintaining the delicate balance between religious freedom and the protection of individual rights in a pluralistic society.