Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v Union of India (1994)

The case of Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v Union of India (1994) became a pivotal judgement in Indian constitutional law, especially concerning the question of whether the State can acquire religious places, such as mosques, temples, and churches. At the heart of the case was the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993, which allowed the Central Government to acquire the land on which the Babri Masjid stood. This case provided clarity on the intersection between the State’s power of acquisition and freedom of religion guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution.

The Supreme Court had to decide whether the government’s acquisition of the disputed land in Ayodhya violated the fundamental rights of Muslims under the Constitution. The Court’s ruling led to significant debates on religious freedom and the doctrine of essentiality in religious practices. This case is also significant as it provided a legal foundation for the later developments in the Ayodhya dispute.

• Citation: AIR 1995 SC 605 A
• Case Number: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 208 of 1993
• Court: Supreme Court of India
• Judgement Date: 24th October 1994
• Bench: Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah, Justice A.M. Ahmadi, Justice M.V. Verma, Justice G. Ray, Justice S. Bharucha

Facts of Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v Union of India

The genesis of the Ismail Faruqui case lay in the 1993 Ayodhya Act, which authorised the acquisition of 67.703 acres of land in Ayodhya, including the land on which the Babri Masjid once stood. The law was passed by the Indian Parliament in the wake of the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992, an event that sparked widespread communal violence. The government sought to acquire the land in order to maintain public order and foster intercommunal harmony.

In response to the Act, Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui, along with other petitioners, challenged its constitutionality in both the High Court and Supreme Court. The petitioners contended that the acquisition violated the constitutional provisions relating to freedom of religion, particularly Article 25 (freedom to practice and propagate religion) and Article 26 (freedom to manage religious affairs). The petitioners argued that the mosque was an integral part of Islamic practice and that its acquisition by the State would infringe upon the rights of Muslims to freely practice their religion.

The Supreme Court was tasked with examining the constitutionality of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act and addressing whether the government’s acquisition of the mosque’s land infringed upon the religious rights of Muslims.

Issues in the Case

The Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v Union of India case primarily raised the following issues:

1. Constitutional Validity of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993: Whether the 1993 Act that allowed the government to acquire the land where the Babri Masjid stood was constitutional.
2. Impact on Religious Rights under Articles 25 and 26: Whether the State’s acquisition of the mosque’s land violated the Muslim community’s right to freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 25 (freedom of conscience and the right to freely practice, preach, and propagate one’s religion) and Article 26 (freedom to manage religious affairs).
3. Doctrine of Essentiality: Whether praying in a mosque is an essential practice of Islam that is protected by Articles 25 and 26 or whether the place of worship itself is necessary for the practice of prayer in Islam.

Petitioners’ Contentions

The petitioners argued that the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993 was unconstitutional for the following reasons:

1. Violation of Constitutional Rights: The petitioners contended that the Act infringed upon fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution, which guarantee freedom of religion and the right to manage religious matters.
2. Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination: The petitioners argued that the Act discriminated against the Muslim community and favoured Hindus, as the land acquisition targeted a mosque, a centre of Muslim worship, while similar treatment was not extended to religious sites belonging to other communities.
3. Infringement of the Right to Worship at a Specific Location: The petitioners argued that mosques are centres of Muslim worship and should be protected from acquisition as they form an essential part of religious practice.
4. Section 4(3) of the Act: The petitioners also contested Section 4(3) of the Act, which abated all pending lawsuits and legal proceedings concerning the disputed land. The petitioners claimed that this provision deprived them of their legal recourse and denied them a fair opportunity to contest the acquisition.

Respondents’ Contentions

The respondents, representing the Union of India, argued that:

1. Public Order and Secularism: The respondents asserted that the purpose of the acquisition was to maintain public order, prevent further communal violence, and promote intercommunal harmony. They claimed that the State’s action was in the public interest and was in line with the secular principles of the Constitution.
2. Government’s Power of Acquisition: The respondents contended that the government had the right to acquire any land, including religious places, under its sovereign powers. They argued that the acquisition did not violate the religious freedoms of Muslims, as the mosque was not essential to the practice of Islam.
3. No Discrimination: The respondents argued that the Act did not discriminate against Muslims. Instead, the government’s objective was to resolve the land dispute peacefully and prevent further communal tensions. They claimed that the acquisition was aimed at resolving the dispute, not favouring one community over another.

Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v Union of India Judgement

The Supreme Court delivered its judgement for Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v Union of India on 24th October 1994, addressing the constitutional validity of the 1993 Act and examining the impact on religious rights under Articles 25 and 26.

The Court held:

Doctrine of Essentiality

The Supreme Court examined whether praying in a mosque is an essential practice of Islam. The Court ruled that praying (Namaz) is an essential practice in Islam, but the place of worship is not necessarily an integral part of the religion, unless the place holds specific religious significance.

The Court clarified that offering prayers at any location is not prohibited in Islam, and as such, the acquisition of the mosque did not infringe upon the religious rights of Muslims unless the location had special religious significance.

Acquisition of Religious Property

The Court found that the State has the sovereign power to acquire property, including religious properties, under the principle of eminent domain, provided such acquisition is for public purposes. The Court ruled that Article 25 (freedom to practice and propagate religion) and Article 26 (freedom to manage religious affairs) do not protect the right to own property but rather the right to practice religion.

Constitutionality of the Act

The Court in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui vs Union of India upheld the constitutionality of the 1993 Act, stating that the government’s acquisition of the land did not violate fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

However, the Court struck down Section 4(3) of the Act, which abated pending legal proceedings related to the land dispute. The Court held that this provision was unconstitutional as it deprived parties of their legal remedies.

Conclusion

The Ismail Faruqui v Union of India case was a landmark decision that dealt with the tension between religious freedom and State power in India. The Court’s ruling upheld the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, allowing the government to acquire land, including the site of the Babri Masjid, under its eminent domain powers. However, the Court clarified that the State could acquire religious sites only if they did not form an essential part of religious practice. This judgement, therefore, became a crucial precedent in balancing the rights to religious freedom and the State’s duty to maintain public order.

The judgement also contributed significantly to the Ayodhya dispute, providing a foundation for future rulings, including the 2019 Supreme Court verdict that eventually resolved the issue by handing the disputed land to the Ram Janmabhoomi Trust. The case continues to be a touchstone for discussions on the role of the State in regulating religious practices and acquiring religious properties in India.