Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation

The case of Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation is a landmark judgement in Indian constitutional law, significantly expanding the interpretation of the right to life under Article 21 to include the right to livelihood.

The decision underscores the importance of balancing the enforcement of laws with the protection of fundamental rights, especially for the most vulnerable sections of society. The ruling also highlights the judiciary’s role in ensuring that state actions do not violate constitutional guarantees, even when enforcing municipal laws.

The Court’s directives in this case aim to protect the rights of the underprivileged while maintaining the rule of law, setting a precedent for the humane treatment of marginalised communities in the face of urban development and infrastructure maintenance.

Facts of Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation

In 1981, the State of Maharashtra and the Bombay Municipal Corporation initiated a campaign to evict slum and pavement dwellers from Bombay under the directive of then Chief Minister, Mr. A. R. Antulay. The eviction was to be executed under Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which empowered municipal authorities to remove encroachments on public streets without prior notice. On July 13, 1981, the Chief Minister ordered the eviction and deportation of these dwellers to their places of origin.

In response to this directive, the affected slum and pavement dwellers filed a writ petition in the High Court of Bombay, seeking an injunction to prevent the authorities from carrying out the eviction. The High Court granted an interim injunction, temporarily halting the eviction until July 21, 1981. Despite assurances from the respondents that no demolitions would occur until October 15, 1981, the petitioners were forcibly removed and transported out of Bombay on July 23, 1981.

The petitioners challenged the eviction on the grounds that it violated their fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. They also sought a declaration that Sections 312, 313 and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, were unconstitutional as they violated Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

Issues Involved in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation

The Supreme Court considered several key issues in Olga Tellis vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation:

1. Estoppel Against Fundamental Rights or Waiver of Fundamental Rights: Whether the petitioners, by conceding to the demolition of their huts, had waived their fundamental rights.
2. Scope of Right to Life under Article 21: Whether the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood.
3. Constitutionality of Provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888: Whether Sections 312, 313 and 314 of the Act were unconstitutional as they violated the fundamental rights of the petitioners.
4. Status of Pavement Dwellers as Trespassers under the Indian Penal Code (IPC): Whether pavement dwellers could be considered trespassers under the Indian Penal Code.

Arguments in Olga Tellis case

Respondent’s Arguments

The defence argued in Olga Tellis vs Bombay Municipal Corporation that the pavement dwellers had acknowledged before the High Court that they did not claim any fundamental right to occupy public spaces like sidewalks or roads. Therefore, they contended that the dwellers had no grounds to prevent the demolition of their encroachments after the agreed-upon date.

The respondents also argued that the principle of estoppel could be applied against the petitioners since they had waived their rights by agreeing to the demolition.

Petitioners’ Arguments

The petitioners argued in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation that the “right to life” under Article 21 of the Constitution includes the right to livelihood. They contended that evicting them from their homes would deprive them of their means of subsistence, which would effectively deprive them of their right to life, making the eviction unconstitutional.

The petitioners also argued that the procedure under Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act was arbitrary and unreasonable. They highlighted that the section allowed the Municipal Commissioner to remove encroachments without notice, which violated the principles of natural justice.

Observations of the Court in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation

On Estoppel Against Fundamental Rights

The Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation held that there can be no estoppel against the Constitution or waiver of fundamental rights. The Court emphasised that no individual can barter away the freedoms granted by the Constitution. Any concession made in error of law or otherwise, that waives fundamental rights cannot create an estoppel against the individual in any legal proceeding. Such a concession would be contrary to the purpose of the Constitution, which is to safeguard these rights.

On the Scope of Right to Life under Article 21

The Court in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation observed that the right to life under Article 21 is broad and far-reaching. It does not merely mean the right to physical survival but includes the right to live with dignity. The right to livelihood is an essential component of the right to life because without a means of subsistence, life would be devoid of its essence and meaning.

The Court noted that if the right to livelihood is not considered a part of the right to life, the easiest way to deprive a person of their right to life would be to deprive them of their means of subsistence. Such deprivation would make life impossible and would violate the constitutional guarantee of the right to life.

The Court in Olga Tellis case also referred to Articles 39(a) and 41 of the Constitution, which direct the State to ensure that its citizens have the right to an adequate means of livelihood and that public assistance is provided in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and other forms of undeserved want. The Court emphasised that it would be a pedantic interpretation to exclude the right to livelihood from the scope of the right to life.

On the Constitutionality of Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act

The Court in Olga Tellis case held that the Constitution does not provide an absolute prohibition against the deprivation of life or personal liberty. Such deprivation must, however, be in accordance with the procedure established by law, as mandated by Article 21. The Court observed that Section 314 is an enabling provision that grants the Municipal Commissioner the discretion to remove encroachments with or without notice. This provision, however, should not be applied arbitrarily or in a manner that disregards the principles of natural justice.

The Court acknowledged that while Section 314 of the Act permits the removal of encroachments without notice, this should be done only in exceptional circumstances where the principles of natural justice cannot be observed. The Court stated that Sections 312(1), 313(1)(a) and 314 of the Act, which empower the Municipal Commissioner to remove encroachments on public streets, cannot be deemed unreasonable or unjust.

On the Status of Pavement Dwellers as Trespassers

The Court discussed in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation whether the pavement dwellers could be considered trespassers under the IPC. It noted that while these dwellers were using public property for unauthorised purposes, their actions were not motivated by an intention to commit an offense or to intimidate, insult or annoy anyone, as would be required to classify their actions as criminal trespass under Section 441 of the IPC.

The Court acknowledged that the encroachments were acts of necessity rather than choice, driven by the harsh realities of poverty and the lack of affordable housing in Bombay. Although technically an encroachment, the Court held that these acts were not criminal in nature.

On the Applicability of Natural Justice

Justice Chinnappa Reddy, speaking for the Court, held that natural justice cannot be excluded merely on the ground that it would not have made a difference to the outcome. The failure to observe natural justice is, in itself, a prejudice to any person and no further proof of harm is necessary. The Court emphasised that even if a person is considered a trespasser, they should be given a reasonable opportunity to leave before force is used to evict them.

Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation Judgement

The Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation ultimately held that the pavement and slum dwellers had a right to life, which included the right to livelihood and that this right could not be curtailed without due process. However, the Court also recognised the government’s duty to maintain public spaces and infrastructure. The Court struck a balance by ruling that while eviction could be carried out, it must be done following a fair procedure that respects the right to livelihood and ensures adequate rehabilitation of those affected.

The Court in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation ordered that no eviction should take place without proper rehabilitation. It also set out several important directives:

• No one has the right to encroach on public spaces such as trails, sidewalks or any other area reserved for public purposes.
• The provision of Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act was deemed not unreasonable given the circumstances of the case.
• Sites must be provided to residents who were censused in 1976.
• Slums that have existed for 20 years or more should not be removed unless the land is required for public purposes and in such cases, alternate sites must be provided.
• High priority should be given to the resettlement of those affected by such evictions.

The Court made an analogy with the case of the Narmada Dam, where although adequate resettlement was ordered, many of the evicted persons were not properly resettled. The Court emphasised that mere provision of resettlement schemes is not enough; their proper implementation is crucial.

Enforcement and Outcomes of Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation

Despite the Court’s directives, the pavement dwellers were evicted without adequate resettlement. Since 1985, the principles established in this case have been reaffirmed in several subsequent decisions, often leading to large-scale evictions without proper resettlement. For instance, in the Narmada Dam cases, although the Court ordered adequate resettlement, many of the displaced persons were not properly relocated and the majority of the Court did not examine the extent to which its judgement was enforced.

Groups Involved in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation

Olga Tellis versus Bombay Municipal Corporation was brought by 11 residents, along with the People’s Union for Civil Liberties, the Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights and two journalists, including Olga Tellis. The petitioners were represented by a team of prominent lawyers including Indira Jaisingh, Ram Jethmalani and V.M. Tarkunde, among others.

Significance of Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation

The Olga Tellis case is a landmark decision that expanded the interpretation of the right to life to include the right to livelihood. It highlighted the delicate balance between enforcing laws and protecting fundamental rights, particularly for vulnerable communities.

While the case is often cited as a precedent for using civil and political rights to advance social rights, it is also criticised for its failure to secure a right to resettlement for evicted individuals. This outcome is seen as inconsistent with developments in other jurisdictions, where courts have recognised stronger rights to resettlement for displaced persons.

Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation Summary

In 1981, the State of Maharashtra and the Bombay Municipal Corporation decided to evict all pavement and slum dwellers from Bombay. The residents claimed that this action would violate their right to life because their homes in the city enabled them to earn a livelihood. They demanded adequate resettlement if the evictions were to proceed.

The Court, while acknowledging that the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution includes the means of livelihood, did not grant the remedies requested by the petitioners. The Court ruled that while the right to livelihood is not absolute, any deprivation must be carried out through a fair and legal procedure. The government’s actions must be reasonable and those affected must be given an opportunity to be heard. In this case, the Court found that the residents had been given a chance to be heard through the Supreme Court proceedings.

Although the residents were not intending to trespass, the Court determined that it was reasonable for the government to evict those living on public pavements, footpaths and roads. The evictions were delayed until one month after the monsoon season, with the final date being October 31, 1985.

The Court did not recognise an automatic right to alternative housing for the evicted dwellers but did order that (i) sites be provided to residents with census cards from 1976, (ii) slums that had existed for 20 years or more should not be removed unless the land was needed for public purposes, in which case alternative sites must be provided and (iii) priority should be given to resettlement.