Landmark Supreme Court Judgements on Dying Declarations in India

A dying declaration is the last statement made by a person on their deathbed, explaining the circumstances of their death. Under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, such declarations are an exception to the hearsay rule and carry immense weight in criminal trials. Over the decades, the Supreme Court of India has shaped the law on dying declarations, clarifying their admissibility, the need (or absence) of corroboration, and the safeguards required to ensure reliability. 

Queen Empress v. Abdullah (1885 ILR 7 All 385)

Brief Facts

In this pre-independence case from the Allahabad High Court, a young girl’s throat was cut by an assailant, rendering her unable to speak. As she lay dying, she communicated by gestures – notably pointing her finger at the person who attacked her.

Legal Principles 

The court held that no particular form is prescribed for recording a dying declaration. A statement by a dying person need not be verbal or written – it can be made through gestures or signs, and such non-verbal indications are admissible as a valid dying declaration. In other words, the law does not insist on any specific format, so long as the intention and identification are clear.

Judgement & Impact

The victim’s gesture identifying the accused was accepted as her dying declaration, leading to the accused’s conviction. This historic ruling established that dying declarations can be made by “any means of communication”, including sign language, greatly expanding the scope of what can be treated as a dying declaration in Indian jurisprudence. It set a precedent that later courts in India would follow when considering unconventional forms of last statements by victims.

Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor (1939 PC 47)

Brief Facts

A few days after a man went missing, his corpse was found stuffed in a trunk on a train. The victim’s wife testified that before he disappeared, he told her he was going to collect money from a person who owed him. This statement was crucial in linking the person he went to meet with the subsequent murder.

Legal Principles

The Privy Council (whose decisions guided Indian law pre-1950) held that the husband’s statement of intent to meet a particular person (who turned out to be the accused) was admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act as a dying declaration. The ruling clarified the meaning of “circumstances of the transaction” in the dying declaration exception – it includes statements explaining the victim’s actions and intentions leading up to death (e.g. where he was going and with whom)​. 

However, general expressions of fear or suspicion not directly related to the cause of death are excluded as too remote​. Crucially, the Privy Council also noted that unlike English law, Indian law does not require the declarant to anticipate death at the time of making the statement; it is enough that the statement relates to the cause or circumstance of death.

Judgement & Impact

The deceased’s statement was deemed relevant and was used to implicate the accused, thereby upholding his conviction. This case became a cornerstone for the admissibility of dying declarations in India. It expanded the scope of Section 32(1) by confirming that statements made by a soon-to-be victim about their future movements or interactions can be treated as dying declarations if they bear a proximate relation to the death​. 

Pakala Narayana Swami’s case has since been frequently cited for its broad interpretation of dying declarations, laying groundwork for how Indian courts handle hearsay statements of deceased persons.

Dalip Singh & Others v. State of Punjab (AIR 1953 SC 364)

Brief Facts 

In this early Supreme Court case, a victim’s dying statement was given to a police officer during the investigation of a murder. The question arose whether such a statement, recorded by a police official rather than a magistrate, could be relied upon as a dying declaration.

Legal Principles

The Supreme Court held that a dying declaration made to a police officer is not invalid per se – it is legally relevant and admissible in evidence. There is no rule barring police from recording a dying declaration, and if the statement is found to be voluntary and true, it can be acted upon. (Notably, while admissible, later judgements have advised caution with police-recorded declarations, but Dalip Singh established they are not outright inadmissible.)

Judgement & Impact

By accepting the victim’s statement to the police as evidence, the Court affirmed the convictions. The impact of this decision was to clarify that dying declarations need not be recorded by a magistrate to carry weight. It underscored that what matters is the authenticity and credibility of the declaration, not the official status of the recorder. This paved the way for later cases to focus on how reliable the statement is rather than who recorded it – although involvement of a magistrate is preferred for credibility, Dalip Singh’s case made clear it’s not a legal necessity.

Kushal Rao v. State of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC 22)

Brief Facts 

The accused was convicted of murder chiefly on the basis of the victim’s dying declaration, which had been recorded properly by a magistrate. On appeal, the accused argued that it was unsafe to base a conviction solely on an uncorroborated dying declaration.

Legal Principles

The Supreme Court decisively rejected the notion that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of a conviction. It observed that there is neither a rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration must be corroborated before it can found a conviction. If a dying declaration has been recorded in a proper manner by a competent authority and the court is satisfied of its truthfulness, it is a “substantive piece of evidence” sufficient to sustain a conviction on its own. In short, a truthful and voluntary dying declaration can suffice without independent confirmation, so long as the court is convinced of its veracity.

Judgement & Impact

Kushal Rao’s conviction was upheld solely on the dying woman’s statement. This judgement became a landmark in Indian jurisprudence, establishing that corroboration of a dying declaration, while often sought as a matter of prudence, is not an absolute legal requirement. The impact is far-reaching: courts routinely cite this case for the principle that they may convict on a dying declaration alone if it “inspires the full confidence of the court.” It shifted the focus to the quality of the declaration – its being free from tutoring, given in a fit mental state, and recorded properly – rather than requiring other evidence.

K. Ramachandra Reddy & Another v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1976 SC 1994)

Brief Facts

In this case, the victim had made a dying declaration identifying the assailants. The statement was relatively brief and recorded under challenging circumstances. The defense questioned the reliability of this declaration, suggesting that the victim might not have been in a fit condition or might have been prompted.

Legal Principles

The Supreme Court used this occasion to stress the importance of careful scrutiny of dying declarations. It laid down that courts **must ensure the declaration is free of any tutoring, prompting, or imagination on the part of the dying person​. The declarant should have had a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and must have been in a fit state of mind while making the statement​. 

In other words, even though a dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction, the court must be fully satisfied of the circumstances under which it was made – that it was voluntary, coherent, and made with the declarant’s faculties intact. This case reinforced that strict scrutiny is required: a dying declaration should be accepted only if it inspires confidence after examining all the surrounding circumstances (who recorded it, when, how, and the condition of the victim).

Judgement & Impact

The Court, after satisfying itself that these conditions were met, upheld the conviction based on the dying declaration. The impact of Ramachandra Reddy’s case lies in its emphasis on procedural integrity and the declarant’s condition. It is often cited in later judgements for the proposition that courts must be on guard – even a seemingly straightforward dying declaration will be evaluated for any hint of coercion or incapacity, ensuring that only trustworthy statements are acted upon​. This case, read with Kushal Rao, strikes a balance: a dying declaration can convict on its own, but only after rigorous judicial scrutiny of its reliability.

Munnu Raja & Another v. State of M.P. (1976) 3 SCC 104 (AIR 1976 SC 2199)

Brief Facts

Here, the victim’s statement detailing the attack was recorded by a police officer as an First Information Report (FIR) shortly before the victim succumbed to his injuries. That FIR effectively served as the victim’s dying declaration. The defense contended that a statement to police (especially one doubling as an FIR) should be viewed with caution or inadmissible as a dying declaration.

Legal Principles

The Supreme Court held that an FIR given by a dying victim can be treated as a dying declaration if it relates to the cause of his death​. There is no legal bar to an FIR being used as evidence under Section 32(1) if the maker dies – it is then essentially his dying declaration. The Court reiterated that there is no requirement of corroboration for a dying declaration: “neither a rule of law nor of prudence” mandates excluding uncorroborated dying declarations​. 

However, the judgement also noted the practical concern that when police record dying declarations, courts should examine them cautiously to ensure they were not influenced. The best practice is to have a magistrate record the statement when possible, but a police-recorded statement is still valid – its weight depends on its credibility, not on who recorded it.

Judgement & Impact

Munnu Raja’s conviction was upheld with the dying declaration (the FIR statement) as the pivotal evidence. The impact of this case is twofold: (1) It confirmed that a victim’s statement to police, even if part of an FIR, is admissible as a dying declaration​, expanding on Dalip Singh. (2) It reinforced the principle from Kushal Rao that courts may base a conviction solely on a dying declaration and that requiring corroboration is just a rule of prudence, not a binding rule of law​. 

Subsequent rulings have frequently cited Munnu Raja to uphold convictions where the only evidence was the dying person’s statement, provided the court was satisfied of its truthfulness.

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 1622)

Brief Facts

In this case, the alleged dying declaration was in the form of a suicide note. A woman had died, and a note purportedly written by her before death (indicating the circumstances leading to her death) was presented as evidence against the accused. The prosecution treated this note as her dying declaration implicating the accused in abetting her suicide or causing her death.

Legal Principles

The Supreme Court held that in general, a suicide note cannot be treated as a sufficient dying declaration for conviction unless it is corroborated by other strong evidence. Unlike the typical dying declaration made in extremis due to homicide or an attack, a suicide note often comes with uncertainties – for instance, questions about its authenticity or completeness. The Court in Sharad Sarda’s case made it clear that such a note, on its own, is usually not enough to sustain a conviction. 

It must be scrutinised alongside other facts, and ordinarily, additional substantive evidence of guilt is required. This was a nuanced departure from the no-corroboration-needed principle – essentially carving out that if the circumstances indicate the “dying declaration” might not be wholly reliable (as with many suicide notes), the court should seek corroboration as a matter of prudence.

Judgement & Impact

Sharad Sarda was acquitted because the suicide note in question was deemed insufficient by itself and other evidence did not meet the standard of proof. The impact of this case is significant: it introduced a cautionary rule for suicide notes and similar self-authored declarations. It underscored that courts must be mindful of the context – a document left by a deceased person is not automatically as convincing as a spoken declaration given to a witness. 

Sharad Sarda’s case is often cited to highlight that the evidentiary value of a dying declaration can vary with the scenario – where doubt exists (like authorship or voluntariness of a note), the court will require corroboration to convict. This adds an important layer to dying declaration jurisprudence, emphasising that reliability is paramount and blanket rules yield to the facts of each case.

Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474 (AIR 1992 SC 1817)

Brief Facts

In this case, multiple dying declarations were involved. A burn victim gave as many as four statements about the incident – some to doctors, one to a magistrate, and one to a police officer – which were not entirely consistent. The High Court had accepted some of these declarations (that incriminated the accused) and rejected others. On appeal, the Supreme Court had to decide which, if any, of the dying declarations could be trusted and what legal standards to apply when multiple statements exist.

Legal Principles

The Supreme Court treated Paniben’s case as an opportunity to comprehensively sum up the law on dying declarations. It reaffirmed several key points from earlier cases​​, including:

• No Rigid Corroboration Rule: There is no absolute rule that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration​. If the declaration is found true and voluntary, conviction can rest on it alone.
• Careful Scrutiny: The declaration must be scrutinised to ensure it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination, and that the victim had a clear opportunity to identify the perpetrator and was in a fit condition to speak​.
• Suspicious or Infirm Declarations: If a dying declaration appears suspicious or suffers from any infirmity, the court should look for corroboration and not rely on it exclusively​. For example, if evidence suggests the deceased was unconscious or physically incapable of making the statement, that declaration must be discarded​.
• Level of Detail: The Court noted that omissions of detail do not invalidate a dying declaration – a statement cannot be rejected merely because it is brief or lacks particulars​. In fact, brevity by itself is not a ground to doubt a statement; sometimes “the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth”​.
• Medical Fitness vs. Eyewitness Testimony: Notably, the Court said if an eyewitness testifies that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make a declaration, that can override a doctor’s contrary opinion​. The logic is that a person present at the scene may better observe the victim’s condition in real time than a belated medical inference.

Applying these principles, the Court accepted the dying declaration it found most reliable and discarded the inconsistent ones.

Judgement & Impact 

The accused’s conviction was ultimately upheld (the Court relying on the consistent and trustworthy statement among the several). Paniben is often cited as a compendium of guidelines on dying declarations. Its impact on Indian jurisprudence is that it synthesised past precedents (including Munnu Raja, Ramachandra Reddy, etc.) into a practical checklist for courts. 

After Paniben, judges had a clearer framework: they could convict on a single dying declaration if convinced of its truth, but they were reminded to cross-check factors like consistency, voluntariness, the declarant’s condition, and so on​​. This case has influenced countless trial and appellate decisions in ensuring that dying declarations are approached with both respect for their value and healthy caution for their pitfalls.

Kamla v. State of Punjab (AIR 1993 SC 374)

Brief Facts

In this case, there existed multiple dying declarations by the victim which were mutually inconsistent regarding how the incident occurred and who was responsible. Different versions of the victim’s last words created uncertainty. The courts had to decide how to treat such contradictory declarations – whether any of them could be trusted enough to base a conviction on, or if corroboration was needed.

Legal Principles

The Supreme Court held that when a case involves more than one dying declaration with material inconsistencies, those declarations cannot be accepted at face value without corroborative support. Specifically, if the declarations differ on essential facts or implicate different individuals, the court must examine them in light of other evidence. 

The declarations should corroborate each other; if they do not, they must at least be consistent with the overall circumstantial and medical evidence of the case. In essence, where multiple dying declarations conflict, the benefit of doubt generally goes to the accused unless one of the versions is clearly proven true by independent evidence. This principle ensures that the prosecution cannot cherry-pick one dying statement out of several contradictory ones to secure a conviction without addressing the discrepancies.

Judgement & Impact

Given the inconsistency in Kamla’s multiple statements, the Supreme Court found it unsafe to uphold a conviction without additional corroboration. The outcome underscored that consistency is key: a dying declaration is powerful, but if the victim himself/herself gave different accounts, it weakens the probative value. 

The impact of this ruling is evident in later cases – courts confronted with multiple dying declarations now carefully compare them. Kamla is frequently cited for the proposition that if multiple dying declarations exist, they ought to be in harmony; otherwise, the court will seek other evidence to decide which (if any) declaration to rely upon. This protects against the risk of convicting someone based on an unreliable or cherry-picked last statement.

Paparambaka Rosamma & Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1999) 7 SCC 695

Brief Facts 

The victim, a woman with 90% burn injuries, gave a statement implicating the accused in setting her on fire. A magistrate recorded her dying declaration. However, notably, the doctor did not certify that she was in a fit mental state to make the declaration at that exact time (even though the doctor was present). The trial court convicted the accused mainly on this dying declaration. On appeal, the lack of an explicit medical fitness certificate became the focal point.

Legal Principles

A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court took a very cautious approach. It held that in the absence of a medical certification of the victim’s fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration, relying on such a dying declaration would be “very much risky”. 

In Paparambaka Rosamma’s view, having the doctor explicitly attest that the injured person is conscious and coherent is a critical safeguard for the reliability of the statement. Without that assurance, the dying declaration’s evidentiary value was suspect. This effectively meant the Court required the recording magistrate or doctor to certify the mental fitness of the declarant as a pre-condition for placing full reliance on the declaration.

Judgement & Impact

Because no such fitness certificate was recorded in Rosamma’s case, the Supreme Court refused to uphold the conviction solely on the dying declaration and gave the benefit of doubt to the accused. The impact of this judgement at the time was significant but also problematic – it introduced a strict technical requirement (doctor’s certification) that was not explicitly mandated by law. 

In several subsequent cases, courts felt bound by Paparambaka Rosamma to look for a medical certificate on the dying declaration and occasionally threw out otherwise credible statements for want of such certification. This stance was viewed as a protection against unreliable statements, but it also sparked confusion because it seemed to elevate form over substance. 

Ultimately, this strict rule did not last long: it was clarified and set aside by a Constitution Bench in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002), which held that the absence of a doctor’s certificate is not by itself a ground to discard a dying declaration if the circumstances otherwise indicate the victim was fit. Thus, Paparambaka’s case is remembered as a short-lived but important checkpoint in dying declaration law – it underscored the importance of the victim’s condition, even though its specific requirement was later relaxed.

Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 (AIR 2002 SC 2973)

Brief Facts

The accused in this case was convicted of murder based on a dying declaration recorded by a magistrate. The magistrate testified that the victim was conscious and understood the questions. However, similar to Paparambaka Rosamma’s scenario, the formal medical fitness certificate was not appended to the dying declaration document. 

The defense argued that, following Paparambaka Rosamma, the declaration should be deemed unreliable without a doctor’s attestation of the victim’s fitness at the time of making it. Owing to conflicting decisions on this point, the matter was referred to a Constitution Bench for an authoritative ruling.

Legal Principles

The five-judge bench in Laxman unequivocally held that the absence of a doctor’s certification of the victim’s fitness is not an automatic ground to reject a dying declaration. What is crucial is that, from the evidence, the court can determine the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give the statement. 

If the person recording the declaration (be it a magistrate, doctor, or other witness) satisfied themselves of the victim’s lucidity and capacity, and it is proven that the victim was indeed capable of making the declaration, then the statement can be relied upon. The Court noted that often the magistrate will personally observe and may even record a note that the victim was fit; a separate doctor’s note, while advisable, is not mandatory. 

Merely not having a doctor’s signature or certificate at the foot of the statement will not render it inadmissible or untrustworthy. In overruling Paparambaka Rosamma, the bench emphasised a return to practicality: so long as the content and surrounding circumstances demonstrate the declaration’s voluntariness and authenticity, it should be given due weight.

Judgement & Impact

The Constitution Bench upheld the conviction, finding that the magistrate’s testimony and other evidence clearly established the victim was in a fit condition while giving the dying declaration. The impact of Laxman on Indian jurisprudence was to settle the law on recording procedure for dying declarations. 

It resolved the confusion by clarifying that a doctor’s certification of mental fitness, though ideal, is not a sine qua non for the acceptance of a dying declaration. What matters is that the person who recorded the statement or others present can verify the victim’s consciousness and clarity. After Laxman, courts no longer throw out dying declarations purely for lack of a doctor’s note; instead, they assess all evidence to judge the victim’s condition. 

This judgement is frequently cited to uphold convictions where the dying declaration was recorded without explicit medical certification, thereby prioritising substance (the truth of the declaration) over form. It stands as the authoritative position that procedural imperfections in recording will not invalidate a genuine dying declaration.

Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2010) 9 SCC 1

Brief Facts

This case involved a triple murder over a family property dispute. One of the victims, before dying, made a detailed declaration (recorded by the investigating officer) naming Atbir, a relative, as the assailant who stabbed the victims. The trial court convicted Atbir and sentenced him to death, relying heavily on the dying declaration. On appeal, the Supreme Court had to consider whether it was safe to confirm a conviction and capital sentence based solely on a dying declaration and under what safeguards.

Legal Principles

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and in doing so laid down an influential set of guidelines for courts assessing dying declarations. Key principles affirmed include:

• Sole Basis for Conviction: A dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court. The court must be convinced that the declaration is truthful and voluntary. If so, no further corroboration is required.
• Declarant’s Mental Fitness: The court should ensure the deceased was in a fit state of mind while making the statement and that it was not a product of tutoring, prompting, or imagination. Any evidence that the victim was incoherent or manipulated will undermine the value of the declaration.
• No Absolute Corroboration Rule: “There cannot be an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated.” The requirement of corroboration is merely a rule of prudence, not a mandatory legal rule. The court noted that insisting on corroboration in every case would defeat the very purpose of the statutory exception.
• When Corroboration is Needed: If there is any suspicion on the dying declaration’s veracity – for example, if it is incomplete, inconsistent, or otherwise doubtful – the courts should look for supporting evidence and not convict solely on that declaration​. In other words, only declarations free of any apparent infirmities can sustain a conviction on their own.
• Completeness and Consistency: The court held that lack of detail in the dying declaration is not a reason to discard it​. Even a brief statement is admissible and can be credible. What matters is that the statement is coherent and consistent on material points. Minor omissions or brevity do not detract from its reliability.

These principles from Atbir have been quoted extensively in later judgements as the distilled wisdom on dying declarations.

Judgement & Impact

The Supreme Court confirmed Atbir’s conviction (and death sentence) based on the dying declaration, finding it to be cogent, reliable, and made in a fit mental state. However, the Court in the same breath acquitted two co-accused who were named in the dying declaration as abettors, because the declaration did not attribute any specific act to them apart from a vague allegation. 

This nuance showed that even when a dying declaration is generally credible, the court will scrutinise the role of each accused – if the declaration lacks details about a particular accused’s involvement, that accused may not be convicted solely on that statement. The impact of Atbir is profound: it has become a touchstone for trial courts and appellate courts when dealing with dying declaration evidence. 

Its guidelines ensure that judges remember both sides of the coin – the potency of a genuine dying declaration and the need for careful evaluation of its truth. In summary, Atbir reaffirmed the primacy of a trustworthy dying declaration in securing justice, and its doctrinal framework is now embedded in Indian evidentiary law.

Bhajju alias Karan Singh v. State of M.P. ((2012) 4 SCC 327)

Brief Facts

The appellant Bhajju was convicted of murdering his wife by setting her on fire. The key evidence was the wife’s dying declaration, recorded by an executive magistrate, in which she unequivocally stated that her husband (Bhajju) ignited her. Bhajju appealed, arguing the dying declaration was not credible and pointed to some relatives who turned hostile in his favor.

Legal Principles

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, strongly reasserting that a truthful dying declaration is sufficient to convict. The bench noted that a person on their deathbed is unlikely to falsely implicate someone – “a person can be convicted on the sole basis of a dying declaration provided it was trustworthy, as a person on his or her death bed would not normally resort to falsehood.”​. 

The Court said there must be a “very serious doubt or infirmity” in the dying declaration for it to be discarded; only if the declaration falls into a category of cases with such serious deficiencies should it be ruled out as sole evidence​. In Bhajju’s case, the declaration was consistent and made in the presence of a magistrate and doctors, leaving no room to doubt its genuineness. 

The Court also echoed the classic maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire (no one at the point of death is presumed to lie) and emphasised that the sanctity of a dying declaration comes from the grave position of the declarant​. Essentially, unless there is some concrete reason to suspect the dying declaration (such as evidence of tutoring or an inability of the victim to speak), the court can safely rely on it alone.

Judgement & Impact

Bhajju’s life sentence was confirmed​. This judgement reinforced the consistent line of authority from Kushal Rao to Atbir. Its impact is seen in how courts cite Bhajju alias Karan Singh to bolster the point that dying declarations carry immense weight. It illustrates the Supreme Court’s continued trust in dying declarations: by 2012, the law was settled that a conviction can rest on such a statement if it rings true. 

The case also serves as a reminder that efforts by interested witnesses to undermine a dying declaration (for instance, relatives retracting earlier statements, as happened in Bhajju’s case) will not prevail against a declaration that the court finds credible​. In sum, Bhajju solidified the principle that the court’s confidence in the truth of the dying declaration is paramount – if that confidence exists, the lack of other evidence is not fatal to the prosecution.

Jayamma & Another v. State of Karnataka (AIR 2021 SC 2399)

Brief Facts

Jayamma was accused (along with another) in a murder case where the conviction was based largely on the victim’s dying declaration. Upon scrutiny, there were some questions regarding the completeness and accuracy of that declaration vis-à-vis other evidence. The Supreme Court in 2021 re-examined whether the dying declaration alone was enough to uphold the conviction.

Legal Principles

The Supreme Court observed that while a “truthful and reliable” dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction, the court must be fully satisfied about its truthfulness and reliability​. If any substantial element of the dying declaration appears doubtful or a significant portion appears untrue, it would be unsafe to convict without corroboration​. In Jayamma’s case, the Court took the view that the dying declaration in question was not wholly consistent with other facts and left certain important details unclear. 

Therefore, as a matter of prudence, the Court held that the conviction could not rest on that declaration alone in the absence of confirming evidence​. This does not contradict the earlier rulings but refines them: essentially, if a dying declaration passes the test of credibility, it alone is enough – but if it partially fails that test, courts should seek corroboration. The judgement underscored that courts should evaluate dying declarations on a case-by-case basis, and if any reasonable doubt arises, the benefit of doubt goes to the accused instead of blindly relying on the declaration.

Judgement & Impact

The Supreme Court in Jayamma’s case set aside the conviction that was solely based on the questionable dying declaration, thereby acquitting the accused (or remanding the case, as the situation warranted). The impact of this decision in recent jurisprudence is a reinforcement of judicial caution. 

It aligns with the long-standing principle that absolute certainty is not demanded in law, but a high degree of confidence is required to convict – and if a dying declaration doesn’t instill that confidence by itself, the court should look for other evidence. Jayamma’s case is often cited alongside the maxim that dying declarations must inspire implicit trust; it serves as a reminder in modern times that courts continue to guard against the risk of error. In practice, this means trial judges and appellate courts will carefully cross-check a dying declaration with surrounding circumstances (medical evidence, witness testimonies, etc.) – especially in cases where the declaration has inconsistencies – before deciding to rely on it alone.

Irfan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1060)

Brief Facts

Irfan was convicted and sentenced to death for allegedly setting a house fire that fatally burned three family members. Two of the dying victims (Irfan’s son and brother) gave dying declarations naming Irfan as the one who set them on fire. However, there were also eyewitness accounts and surrounding circumstances that raised questions about the accuracy of those dying declarations. 

For instance, witnesses said they rescued the victims, yet the dying declarations oddly did not mention these witnesses or certain details of the incident​​. Irfan appealed, contending that the dying declarations were not reliable enough to uphold his conviction.

Legal Principles

The Supreme Court found the dying declarations in this case to be shrouded in suspicion and gave the benefit of doubt to the accused​​. Importantly, the Court went on to outline an extensive (non-exhaustive) list of factors that courts should consider when evaluating the weight to be given to a dying declaration​​. These factors (drawn from precedent and elaborated in Irfan’s case) include:

• Whether the person was expecting death at the time (though not a legal requirement, it can affect psychology)​.
• Whether the declaration was made at the first available opportunity or after delay (the “rule of first opportunity”)​.
• Whether there is any indication that the declaration was put into the mouth of the dying person by someone else (i.e. fabricated)​.
• Whether the statement was a result of prompting, tutoring or leading questions by police or interested parties​.
• Whether the declaration was properly recorded (e.g., any procedural lapses or missing signatures)​.
• Whether the declarant had a clear opportunity to observe what happened and recognize the assailant​.
• Whether the dying declaration has remained consistent or if the person gave multiple declarations, are they consistent with each other?​.
• Whether the content seems like a product of the declarant’s imagination rather than an eyewitness account​.
• Whether the declaration appears to be made voluntarily, without coercion​.
• In case of multiple dying declarations, whether the first one is trustworthy and how it compares with subsequent ones​.
• Whether the medical condition of the declarant (nature of injuries) would have permitted them to make the statement at all​.

The Court in Irfan reiterated that if there is any serious suspicion or flaw in the dying declaration, it is unsafe to convict on that basis alone​. In such scenarios, the dying declaration should be treated as just a piece of evidence rather than the sole cornerstone, and the court should look for corroboration from other evidence​.

Judgement & Impact

After examining the discrepancies and the fact that the dying declarations were not corroborated by the physical and testimonial evidence, the Supreme Court set aside Irfan’s conviction and acquitted him​. This decision in 2023 serves as a contemporary confirmation of the careful approach Indian courts must take. 

The impact of Irfan v. State of U.P. is seen as a reaffirmation that the judiciary’s primary goal is to ensure no miscarriage of justice due to an uncritical acceptance of a questionable dying declaration​​. The enumerated factors from this case act as a practical checklist (much like Paniben did in 1992) for trial judges to evaluate dying declarations. 

In effect, Irfan has become a recent touchstone: it underscores that while dying declarations are given due weight, courts will vigilantly guard against convicting someone on a declaration that doesn’t “inspire full confidence” in its truth. It reflects continuity in the law – echoing principles from earlier landmark cases – and applies them to ensure justice is served even in the most serious of cases (here, a death penalty was at stake).

Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024 SCC OnLine SC 237)

Brief Facts

This case arose from a tragic incident in 2016 where a woman, Shahin Parveen, was burnt alive. Before succumbing to her injuries, she gave a dying declaration alleging that her brother-in-law (Pappi @ Mashkoor) had set her ablaze, and she mentioned two others (Naeema and Naeem) in connection with the incident. The motive suggested was a property dispute and pressure to engage in immoral activities​. The trial court convicted all three accused based on her dying declaration, and the High Court affirmed the convictions. On further appeal, the Supreme Court revisited the evidence.

Legal Principles

The Supreme Court referred to its earlier landmark ruling in Atbir v. NCT of Delhi (2010) and reiterated several principles. It emphasized that a dying declaration can indeed be the sole basis for conviction if it is credible and made in a fit mental state. The Court must ensure the declaration was true, voluntary, and not a result of tutoring or delusion. 

In Naeem’s case, the Supreme Court found the dying declaration of Shahin Parveen to be credible with respect to the main culprit (Pappi @ Mashkoor) – it clearly described his act of pouring kerosene and setting her on fire. However, concerning the other two accused (Naeema and Naeem), the dying declaration was vague – it mentioned they “aided” Mashkoor but did not assign any specific role or overt act to them. 

The Court held that in the absence of particularized details of their involvement, it would be unsafe to convict Naeema and Naeem solely on that declaration. This reflects the principle that each accused is entitled to individual scrutiny of the evidence against them: a dying declaration must be evaluated in parts if it implicates multiple people, judging the clarity and weight of allegation against each.

Judgement & Impact

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Pappi @ Mashkoor, who was clearly and unequivocally implicated by the dying woman’s statement (his life sentence for murder was affirmed). Conversely, the Court acquitted Naeema and Naeem, giving them the benefit of doubt since the dying declaration did not detail how they participated in the crime. 

The impact of Naeem v. State of U.P. is notable in underscoring a nuanced application of dying declaration law: it demonstrates that courts will not blindly sweep up every named individual in a dying declaration without scrutinizing the extent and certainty of their alleged involvement. This decision from 2024 also reinforces the longevity of the principles set by earlier cases – the Court cited Atbir (2010) and followed its guidance closely. In doing so, it reassured that the established jurisprudence (that a reliable dying declaration is enough for conviction) is still very much valid, while also illustrating that the judiciary remains careful and fair by not overextending a doubtful implication. 

In summary, Naeem’s case in 2024 stands as a modern affirmation that a dying declaration is a powerful piece of evidence, but its strength lies in its credibility and clarity, which must be assessed separately for each accused to ensure justice for all parties involved.