52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985

Political defections, commonly known as ‘floor crossing’ or ‘party hopping’, have long been a bane for the Indian democratic system. Before the enactment of the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act in 1985, defections by elected representatives were rampant, leading to unstable governments and political turmoil. 

The Amendment sought to put a legal end to such practices by introducing the Anti-Defection Law through the insertion of the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution of India. This law aimed to strengthen the democratic fabric by ensuring political stability and safeguarding the voters’ mandate.

Historical Background of 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985

After India’s independence, the country embraced the concept of universal adult franchise, empowering every citizen above 18 years to elect their representatives. However, this democratic exercise was undermined by the frequent defections of legislators. The elected members often shifted allegiance for personal gains, ministerial berths, or under political pressure, destabilising governments.

One of the most notorious cases was that of Gaya Lal, a Haryana legislator, who defected thrice in a single day in 1967, giving rise to the phrase “Aaya Ram Gaya Ram” symbolising political opportunism. Between 1957 and 1967, the Congress party gained significantly from such defections, strengthening its hold on power while many smaller parties weakened or dissolved.

In response to growing instability, the Chavan Committee was formed in 1967 to study the issue. It recommended framing an anti-defection law, but no legislative action followed immediately. The problem persisted, culminating in the collapse of the Janata government in 1979 after defections of nearly 76 MPs.

Recognising the pressing need to curb such political malpractice, the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi introduced the Anti-Defection Bill in 1984. This culminated in the enactment of the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, which inserted the Tenth Schedule in 1985, thereby formalising the anti-defection framework.

Objectives of the 52nd Constitutional Amendment

The Amendment was enacted with the primary objective of combating political defections that threatened constitutional governance and democratic values. Specifically, it aimed to:

1. Curb Political Corruption: Defections often involved inducements such as money or ministerial positions. The law sought to deter such practices, thereby contributing to reducing corruption at large.
2. Ensure Political Stability: Frequent defections led to the fall of elected governments, disrupting legislative functioning and governance. The Amendment aimed to prevent such instability.
3. Protect the People’s Mandate: By discouraging legislators from changing parties post-election, the law sought to uphold the faith of voters in their elected representatives and parties.
4. Strengthen Party Discipline and Accountability: Legislators were to be loyal and responsible to their political parties, maintaining internal cohesion and democratic decision-making.
5. Safeguard Regional Parties: Smaller parties, especially regional ones, were often the victims of defections to larger national parties. The Amendment aimed to protect their interests and viability.

Key Features of the 52nd Constitutional Amendment

The Tenth Schedule

The core of the Amendment is the Tenth Schedule, which outlines the anti-defection law’s provisions. It lays down the grounds for disqualification and procedures to deal with defection cases.

Grounds for Disqualification

An elected member can be disqualified under the following circumstances:

• Voluntary Resignation: If a member voluntarily gives up membership of their political party after being elected, they face disqualification. This includes any conduct implying abandonment of party membership.
• Contravening Party Whip: Voting or abstaining against the directions issued by the party’s authorised whip on crucial matters such as money bills, confidence motions, or no-confidence motions leads to disqualification.
• Independent Candidates Joining a Party: Members elected as independents who join a political party post-election are liable for disqualification.
• Nominated Members Joining a Party: Members nominated to the legislature must not join any political party within six months of taking their seat; failing which, they may be disqualified.

Disqualification Process and Role of the Speaker

The Speaker or Chairman of the respective legislative house holds the authority to decide on disqualification petitions. Their decision is subject to judicial review but there is no fixed time frame prescribed by law for them to decide. The discretion vested in the Speaker has, at times, led to concerns regarding impartiality.

Exceptions to Disqualification

The law initially allowed:

• Splits: Defections by at least one-third of the members of a political party were exempted from disqualification, viewed as a legitimate split.
• Mergers: If at least two-thirds of the members of a party agree to merge with another party, they are exempted from disqualification.

However, the “split” exemption was removed by the 91st Amendment Act in 2003 to prevent misuse, while the threshold for mergers was retained at two-thirds.

Burden of Proof

When a member faces disqualification, the burden lies on them to prove that they did not voluntarily give up their party membership. The judiciary has clarified that public acts and statements indicating resignation can be grounds for disqualification.

Landmark Judgements on 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985

The anti-defection law has been subject to significant judicial scrutiny. Some notable cases include:

• Keshavananda Bharati v. Union of India (1973): Affirmed that judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution, and Speaker’s decisions are subject to it.
• Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachilhu (1992): Validated the constitutionality of the Tenth Schedule but struck down the provision barring judicial review of Speaker’s decisions.
• Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya (2007): Expanded the interpretation of “voluntarily giving up membership” to include public communications to the Governor.
• Mannadi Satyanarayan Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly (2009): Held that courts cannot interfere during the pendency of disqualification proceedings but only after the Speaker’s final order.
• Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur (2020): Criticised the Speaker’s exclusive jurisdiction and recommended creation of an independent adjudicatory mechanism.

Role of the Governor

Before the landmark S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) judgement, Governors wielded considerable power to recommend President’s Rule when defections destabilised a state government. However, the Supreme Court curtailed such discretionary powers, enhancing the sanctity of elected governments. Today, the Governor has no role in disqualification proceedings under the anti-defection law, which solely rests with the Speaker or Chairman.

Conclusion

The 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act was a landmark reform designed to protect India’s democracy from the destabilising effects of political defections. Over three decades later, while the law has enhanced political stability and discipline, it continues to grapple with procedural and practical issues. Balancing party cohesion with legislators’ freedom and ensuring unbiased adjudication remain ongoing challenges.