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Each jurisdiction establishes specific time limits within which a legal action must be initiated. These are known as “limitation periods.” The rationale stems from two Latin principles: interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is in the public interest that litigation should end) and vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law assists those who are diligent in asserting their rights, not those who remain idle). 

If a claim is brought after the relevant limitation period has run, the court will ordinarily refuse to entertain it. This encourages parties to pursue remedies promptly and prevents stale controversies from lingering indefinitely.

In India, these deadlines are governed by the Limitation Act, 1963. Its primary aim is to ensure disputes are resolved without undue delay, fostering legal certainty.

Contents hide

Historical Evolution of Limitation Law

  • Pre-1859 Situation: Prior to 1859, there was no uniform limitation statute covering all of British India. Instead, various local regulations applied in different regions. In the three Presidencies, courts under the British East India Company followed bespoke rules, while the Charter-established courts in the Presidency towns adopted English law. This patchwork led to inconsistencies.
  • Limitation Act of 1859 (Act XIV of 1859): Enacted to unify limitation rules across India, this law took effect in 1862 and covered only the time frame for bringing suits. It did not address “prescription” (i.e., acquisition or loss of rights through long-continued use). Its scope was limited to setting deadlines for filing civil claims.
  • Limitation Act of 1871: Replacing the 1859 enactment, the 1871 Act introduced foundational principles for computing and excluding certain periods from the limitation clock. The actual time limits for different causes of action were relegated to a table appended to the statute.
  • Limitation Act of 1877: Substituting the 1871 Act, the 1877 version made minor adjustments to suit-types and their respective periods. It also broadened the law of prescription:
    1. Property Rights: Whereas the 1871 Act applied prescription only to land or hereditary offices, the 1877 Act extended it to all forms of movable and immovable property.
    2. Easements & Profits-à-Prendre: The earlier Act provided that easements (e.g., rights of way) could accrue after 20 years of continuous use; the 1877 Act included profits-à-prendre (rights to take resources from another’s land).
  • Limitation Act of 1908: This repealed the 1877 legislation but largely retained its core concepts. During the same era, the Indian Easements Act, 1882, came into force. Consequently, the 1908 Limitation Act specifically stated that its easement-related provisions would not apply in territories governed by the Easements Act.
  • Limitation Act of 1963: Drafted by the Third Law Commission, it replaced the 1908 statute. Notably, it extended coverage beyond foreign contracts to include contracts made in (then) Jammu & Kashmir. Eventually, after the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, the Limitation Act applies uniformly throughout India.

Objectives and Scope of the Limitation Act, 1963

The Act’s primary purpose is to prevent legal matters from dragging on indefinitely and to encourage prompt resolution. It establishes, for various suits, appeals, and applications, the maximum time within which they must be filed. If a cause of action remains unpursued beyond that period, the remedy is barred.

  • Coverage:
    • Civil suits
    • Appeals and applications for leave to appeal
    • Certain applications and petitions (e.g., for letters of administration)
  • Structure:
    • 32 Sections
    • 137 Articles
    • Divided into 10 Parts, including schedules that specify limitation periods

Retrospective Operation

Limitation statutes are generally procedural. Unless a statute explicitly provides otherwise, its rules apply to all proceedings initiated after its enactment, even if the underlying cause of action arose earlier. Key judicial pronouncements affirm this:

  • B.K. Education Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Parag Gupta & Associates (2018): The Supreme Court held the Limitation Act to be procedural, applying retrospectively.
  • Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. vs. Union of India (2011): The Supreme Court observed that limitation laws are procedural and apply to causes of action accrued before the Act’s enactment.
  • Excise & Taxation Commissioner vs. Frigoglass India Pvt. Ltd. (2019): The Punjab & Haryana High Court reiterated that limitation statutes are procedural, thus having retrospective effect unless a contrary intent is explicitly stated.

Key Definitions (Section 2)

  1. Applicant:
    • Any petitioner bringing a suit or appeal
    • Anyone entitled to step into the petitioner’s shoes (e.g., assignee of a cause of action)
    • Legal representatives (executor, administrator, etc.) of a deceased applicant
  2. Application: Includes any petition or request to a court (e.g., application for leave to appeal)
  3. Bill of Exchange: Extends to hundis and cheques
  4. Bond: Any document where a party undertakes to pay a sum of money, possibly with conditions that may discharge the obligation
  5. Easement: A non-contractual right to use another’s land (e.g., right of way, watercourse)
  6. Period of Limitation: The time prescribed in the Schedule for filing a suit, appeal, or application. “Prescribed period” refers to the duration computed according to the Act’s rules.
  7. Promissory Note: A written promise to pay a specified sum on demand or at a future date
  8. Trustee: Excludes:
    • A benamidar (i.e., someone holding nominal title)
    • A mortgagee who remains in possession after the mortgage debt has been discharged
    • Anyone wrongfully occupying property without title

Limitation of Suits, Appeals, and Applications (Part II)

Section 3: Remedies for Limitation Bars

  • Any suit, appeal, or application filed after the prescribed period is liable to be dismissed—even if no one specifically raises the limitation defence.
  • Filing Deemed To Occur When:
    • The plaint (complaint) is presented to the proper court officer (in a regular suit).
    • A pauper applicant (indigent litigant who seeks to proceed without paying court fees) submits an application for leave to sue.
    • In winding-up proceedings, a creditor files a claim with the official liquidator.
    • For high-court applications (e.g., petitions for special leave to appeal), the moment the petition is handed to the correct registry.
  • Counterclaims & Set-offs (Section 3(2)(b)): If the defendant brings a counterclaim against the plaintiff in the same suit, that counterclaim is treated as a separate suit but is deemed to have been filed on the same date as the original pleadings.
  • Judicial Clarifications:
    • Punjab National Bank & Ors. vs. Surendra Prasad Sinha (1992): The Supreme Court held limitation bars the remedy but not the underlying right.
    • As 15/1996 vs. K.J. Anthony (2013): A defendant may still plead a limitation-barred defence, though it may not ultimately be enforceable.
    • Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. The State of Bombay (1957): Time-barred debts remain intact; limitation only bars legal recourse.

Limitation Does Not Preclude Defence

  • Even if a suit is barred by limitation, the defendant remains free to admit or pay a time-barred debt.

Noteworthy Judgements:

  • Rullia Ram Hakim Rai vs. S. Fateh Singh & Ors. (1961): Limitation bars the action, not the defence; a debtor can discharge a stale claim.
  • Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi vs. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (2002): Though a plaintiff loses the ability to enforce a time-barred claim, the defendant can still present a stale defence if they so choose.

Plea of Limitation: Court’s Obligation

  • Section 3 is mandatory: the court must dismiss any proceeding barred by limitation—even if the limitation point is not raised by any party.
  • Verifications from Case Law:
    • Craft Centre & Ors. vs. Koncherry Coir Factories (1990): The onus lies on the plaintiff to show the suit is within time. If relying on an acknowledgment to save a suit from being time-barred, the plaintiff must plead and prove the acknowledgment when challenged. Section 3 admits no exceptions.
    • ICICI Bank Ltd. vs. Trishla Apparels Pvt. Ltd. (2015): If a suit is filed out of time, the court must dismiss it of its own motion. No party need point out the limitation bar.
    • Mukund Ltd. vs. Mumbai International Airport & Ors. (2011): Once a suit is shown to be time-barred, the court cannot consider merits or evidence; it must naturally dismiss the claim.

Commencement of Limitation

  • The Act’s Schedule specifies, for each type of suit or application, when the limitation period begins:
    • Typically, from the date the cause of action accrues (e.g., when the breach or tort occurs)
    • For appeals, from the date the decree or judgement is pronounced
    • For certain notices (e.g., under rent control or tenancy causes), from the date of service
  • Judicial Insight: Trustee’s Port Bombay vs. Premier Automobile Ltd. & Ors. (1974): The Supreme Court clarified that limitation for a suit starts when the cause of action arises.

When the Court Is Closed (Section 4)

  • If the last day of the limitation period falls on a court holiday or when the court is otherwise closed, the suit, appeal, or application may be filed on the next working day without penalty.
  • Illustration: If the filing deadline is 30 December (when courts are closed), a litigant can file on 1 January (when courts reopen).

Condonation of Delay (Section 5)

Courts may extend prescribed periods for appeals and certain applications if the appellant/applicant can demonstrate “sufficient cause” for not filing on time. This does not apply to ordinary civil suits (Section 3).

  • Examples of “Sufficient Cause”:
    • Being misled by a High Court order or practice (e.g., under Order XXI of CPC)
    • Serious illness, natural disaster, or other unavoidable impediments
  • Key Rulings:
    • State of Kerala vs. K.T. Shaduli Yussuff (1977): Whether “sufficient cause” exists depends on facts of each case.
    • Balwant Singh (Dead) vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors. (2010): A delay of 778 days, without adequate explanation, was not condoned.
    • Ornate Traders Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Income Tax Officer (2008): If an applicant acts bona fide and provides a reasonable justification, courts generally lean toward condonation. Mere negligence or carelessness militate against it.
    • H.H. Brij Indar Singh vs. Lala Kanshi Ram (1917): The yardstick is whether the litigant acted with reasonable diligence.
    • Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (1987): The Supreme Court held “sufficient cause” should be liberally construed to advance substantial justice, not squash it on technicalities. Principles established:
      1. A delayed filer gains no actual advantage from tardiness.
      2. The reasons must be realistically explained.
      3. Delay can jeopardize a party’s case.
      4. The judiciary’s role is to remove injustice, not perpetuate it through rigid timelines.

Legal Disability and Its Impact (Sections 6–8)

Section 6: Effect of Legal Disability

When a person entitled to file a suit or application is under a “legal disability” (minority, unsound mind, or idiocy), the limitation period does not begin until the disability ceases.

  1. Minor or Mentally Unsound: If they have a cause of action before 18 years of age (or before unsoundness ends), the clock starts when they turn 18 (or regain mental capacity).
  2. Multiple Disabilities: If someone is, say, both a minor and mentally unsound simultaneously, the period begins only after both disabilities have ended.
  3. Death While Disabled:
    • If a disabled person dies before the cause of action accrues, their legal representative can sue within the same period that the deceased would have had, counting from the date of death.
    • If the legal representative is also disabled at that time, the same protection (i.e., postponement) applies.
  4. Death After Disability Ends but Before Filing: If a person regains capacity and then dies during the remaining limitation period, their representative can still file within the balance of the original period.
  • Definition of “Minor”:  Includes a child in utero.

Section 7: Disability of One Among Several Co-claimants

If multiple persons share a right to sue (or to execute a decree) and one is disabled:

  1. If the others can resolve the matter without the disabled person, the limitation period runs for all.
  2. If the matter cannot be resolved without the disabled person, the limitation is suspended for everyone until either that person’s disability ends or the remaining persons can resolve the issue without them.
  • Illustration (Hindu Undivided Family):  Under Mitakshara law, the Karta (family manager) can act alone on joint family property; thus, co-owners are not simultaneously disabled from filing if the Karta can proceed.

Section 8: Special Exceptions to Sections 6 & 7

  • Rights of Pre-emption: Extensions under Sections 6 & 7 do not apply to suits enforcing rights of pre-emption.
  • Maximum Extension: Even with the disability-based stoppage, limitation cannot be extended beyond three years from the date the disability ends (or from date of death, if still within the three-year cap).

Continuation of Limitation (Section 9)

  • Once a limitation period begins, it runs continuously without pause.
  • Exception: If a debtor is granted letters of administration over the creditor’s estate, the limitation for a suit to recover that debt is suspended while the administration continues.

Suits Against Trustees (Section 10)

No limitation applies to suits filed against a trustee (or their representative) to recover trust property or profits thereof. This protection extends to managers of religious or charitable endowments under Hindu, Muslim, or Buddhist law.

Contracts Made Outside Act’s Territory (Section 11)

When a suit is filed in India on a contract executed outside India (or, prior to full integration, in the former State of Jammu & Kashmir), the limitation rules of the 1963 Act govern—even if local law in that foreign place provided a different period—except in two scenarios:

  1. The local law had wholly extinguished the contract (i.e., it was void under foreign law).
  2. At the relevant time, both contracting parties were domiciled in that foreign territory.

Computation of Limitation Periods (Sections 12–15)

Section 12: Exclusion of Certain Days

  1. First Day Excluded: The day on which a cause of action accrues is not counted; computation starts on the next calendar day.
  2. Appeals/Reviews: The day on which the decree or order is pronounced is excluded when counting for appeals, revisions, or reviews. Additionally, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgement, decree, or order is also excluded. If appealing or seeking review of an award, the period required to obtain a certified copy of the arbitral award is excluded.
  3. Preparation Time Not Excluded:Any delay by the court in preparing the decree or order before it is requested does not count toward the excluded time. Only the period after the copy is requisitioned is excluded.

Section 13: Pauper Applications

If someone applies for leave to sue/appeal as a pauper (i.e., without paying court fees), the time spent on that leave application is excluded from limitation. If the leave application is denied, the underlying suit/appeal may still be entertained if fees are paid later.

Section 14: Proceedings in a Court Without Jurisdiction

Time during which a party, in good faith, pursues proceedings in a court that lacks jurisdiction is excluded when computing limitation for a fresh action against the same person for the same relief.

  1. Whether initiating a fresh suit or an application, time spent in prior (misplaced) proceedings is excluded, provided they were prosecuted bona fide and failed only due to jurisdictional defect.
  2. Misjoinder of parties or causes of action is treated as a jurisdictional defect.
  3. An appeal pending before a superior court also counts as “prosecuting a proceeding,” so time spent there is excluded.

Section 15: Other Exclusions

Certain intervals are excluded from limitation:

  1. Injunction or Stay: If a suit or execution is stayed by an injunction or court order, the stay period (including its issue and withdrawal dates) is excluded.
  2. Prior Notice or Consent: When a suit requires notice to or consent from a government department or authority, the period to give such notice or obtain consent/sanction is excluded, including days of application and order.
  3. Insolvency & Liquidation Proceedings: Time from the start of insolvency or winding-up proceedings until three months after the appointment of a receiver or liquidator is excluded for suits to enforce a decree by such officials.
  4. Proceeding to Set Aside Sale in Execution: For a suit seeking possession by a decree-sale purchaser, the time spent in a proceeding to set aside that sale is excluded.
  5. Defendant Absent from India (Section 15(5)): Period during which a defendant remains outside India (or any territory under central administration) is excluded, provided that absence is pleaded and proved. M.K. Chabbra vs. Damanjit Kaur (2019): The Delhi High Court held that Section 15(5) requires specific proof of the defendant’s foreign absence.

Postponement of Limitation (Sections 16–24)

Section 16: Effect of Death on or Before Cause of Action

  • Death Before Cause of Action (Plaintiff): If a person entitled to sue dies before the cause of action arises, limitation begins when their legal representative can institute the suit.
  • Death Before Cause of Action (Defendant): If the defendant dies before the cause of action accrues, the time limit begins when their legal representative can be sued.
  • Exclusions (Section 16(3)): Rights of pre-emption and suits for possession of immovable property or a hereditary office are not covered by Section 16.
  • Judicial Illustration: Rajjo Bibi vs. Chhotey Lal (1995): The Allahabad High Court held that if a mortgagor dies before claiming mortgaged property, the limitation period for redemption begins when the representative is in place.

Section 17: Effect of Fraud or Mistake

Limitation does not run until the plaintiff/applicant discovers the fraud, concealment, or mistake that forms the basis of the suit/application.

  • If the suit is grounded on a defendant’s fraud, it begins when the fraud is discovered.
  • If the fraud concealed a right/title, it begins when that hidden right/title is discovered.
  • If the action seeks to correct a mistake, it begins when the mistake is discovered.
  • If a necessary document is hidden by fraud, it begins when that document is discovered or could be produced.
  • Exceptions: If a bona fide purchaser acquires property for value without notice of fraud or mistake, they cannot be sued to enforce any charge upon that property under Section 17.
  • Additional Provision (Section 17(2)): If a judgement-debtor has obstructed execution of a decree through fraud or force, the creditor may, within one year of discovering that fraud/force, apply to extend the execution period.

Section 18: Effect of Acknowledgement in Writing

A valid written acknowledgment of liability, signed by the debtor (or authorised agent), before expiry of limitation, restarts the limitation period from the date of that acknowledgment.

  • An undated acknowledgment may be dated through oral testimony (though the contents cannot be proved orally under the Evidence Act, 1872).
  • An acknowledgment remains valid even if it does not specify the precise nature of the asset or right, so long as it confirms the debt or liability.
  • The term “signed” includes an authorised agent’s signature.
  • Applications to execute a decree/order are not “concerning any property or right” for purposes of Section 18.
  • Case Application:
    • Laxmi Pat Surana vs. Union Bank of India & Another (2021): The Supreme Court held that Section 18 also applies to insolvency applications under Section 7 of the IBC. A written acknowledgment of debt can extend limitation for filing an insolvency petition.

Section 19: Effect of Payment on Account of Debt or Interest on Legacy

When a debtor (or authorised agent) makes a payment towards the principal debt or interest on a legacy before the limitation expires, a fresh limitation period begins from the date of payment.

  • For interest payments after 1 January 1928, a written acknowledgment of such payment is required.
  • If mortgaged land is in the mortgagee’s possession, receipt of rent/produce counts as payment.
  • “Debt” excludes sums due under a court decree or order.

Section 20: Acknowledgment/Payment by Another Person

  • Agent for Disabled Person: For someone under a disability, “duly authorised agent” includes their legal guardian, committee, or manager, or someone authorised by them to acknowledge or make payment.
  • Joint Debtors/Contractors: A written acknowledgment or payment by one of multiple joint obligors does not automatically bind the others, unless specifically authorised.
  • Hindu Undivided Family: An acknowledgment or payment by the karta (HUF manager) or his authorised agent binds the entire family, including successors (reversioners).

Section 21: Substituting or Adding New Party

If a new plaintiff or defendant is joined after a suit’s institution, limitation for that new party starts from the date of their addition. If omission of a party was due to an honest mistake and the court so records, the suit may be deemed to have been instituted for that party on the original date.

Requirement of Court Order: A formal order must explicitly declare that the suit is taken to be instituted on the earlier date; mere inclusion/substitution is insufficient without such an order.

Section 22: Continuing Breaches and Torts

In cases of contract breaches or torts that persist over time, a new limitation period begins from the last act in the series of wrongful acts.

Section 23: Suits for Compensation Not Actionable Without Special Damage

  • When a one-time wrongful act causes “special damage” (making it actionable), limitation begins from the moment the injury occurs.
  • Judicial Note: Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare vs. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan & Ors. (1959): A continuing wrong requires that the wrongful act itself continue to inflict new injury, not merely that the damage from a single act persists.

Section 24: Instruments and Gregorian Calendar

All time periods mentioned in contracts or deeds must be computed according to the Gregorian calendar.

Delay in Using Government and Private Property (Section 25)

  • Easements Over Government Property: Open, continuous, and uninterrupted use of light, air, a way, or watercourse over government land for 30 years confers an absolute and indefeasible right to continue such use.
  • Easements Over Private Property: Similar enjoyment of such easements over private land for 20 years creates an absolute right.
  • Interruption Defined: An interruption is actual deprivation of possession or enjoyment by a third party, lasting at least one year from when the claimant becomes aware.
  • Note: Section 25 is repealed in the State of Odisha.

Exclusion for Reversioner of Servient Tenement (Section 26)

If someone enjoys an easement (e.g., right of way, use of water) over land/water held under a life interest or a lease exceeding three years, that period of enjoyment during the life interest/lease is not counted toward the 20-year prescription period—provided the reversioner challenges the easement within three years of acquiring the land.

  • Note: Section 26 is repealed in Odisha.
  • Judicial Illustration: Siti Kanta Pal vs. Radha Gobinda Sen (1928): The Calcutta High Court clarified that enjoyment of an easement for 20 years does not, by itself, vest an absolute right. Only once challenged and successfully defended does the right become complete.

Extinguishment of Right by Adverse Possession (Section 27)

  • Ordinarily, limitation bars a remedy but not the underlying right. Section 27 is an exception: it deals with adverse possession.
  • If a person occupies or uses another’s land in a manner that is open, hostile, continuous, and uninterrupted for the statutory period, they may acquire legal title.
  • Once the rightful owner fails to assert their rights within the specified period, the adverse possessor’s right becomes complete, effectively extinguishing the original owner’s title.

Savings Clauses (Section 29)

  1. Section 29(1): Nothing in the Limitation Act affects the provisions of Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which addresses performance of contracts in certain cases.
  2. Section 29(2): If a special or local law prescribes a limitation period shorter than the Limitation Act’s Schedule, that shorter period governs for instituting, preferring, or filing the suit/appeal/application. Sections 4–24 of the Limitation Act apply to those special/local laws unless expressly excluded.
  3. Section 29(3): Except for laws relating to marriage and divorce, the Limitation Act does not apply to any suit or proceeding governed by those laws.
  4. Section 29(4): Sections 25 and 26 (dealing with easements/prescription) and the definition of “easement” (Section 2) do not apply to areas where the Indian Easements Act, 1882, is in force.

Transitional Provisions for Shorter Periods (Section 30)

  • Some suits, appeals, or applications had shorter periods under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Section 30 addresses how to handle those transitional cases:
    1. Suit with Shorter Period under 1908 Act (Section 30(a)): A suit barred under the 1908 Act may be instituted within seven years from the 1963 Act’s commencement or within the period under the 1908 Act—whichever is shorter. If a combination of the 1908 Act’s elapsed time plus the seven years under the 1963 Act is still less than the period the 1963 Act prescribes, the suit may be filed within the 1963 Act’s period.
    2. Appeal/Application with Shorter Period under 1908 Act (Section 30(b)): Such appeals or applications may be filed within ninety days from the commencement of the 1963 Act or within the period under the 1908 Act—whichever expires earlier.

Provisions for Barred or Pending Suits at Commencement (Section 31)

  1. Section 31(a): If, at the 1963 Act’s commencement, the period under the 1908 Act had already expired for instituting a suit/appeal/application, the 1963 Act does not revive that proceeding.
  2. Section 31(b): Any suit, appeal, or application already instituted, preferred, or filed—and pending when the 1963 Act came into force—remains unaffected by the new Act.

Conclusion

The Limitation Act, 1963, prescribes definitive time frames within which various civil suits, appeals, and applications must be initiated. It does not create new rights but governs enforcement of existing ones. While its schedules lay down precise periods, the Act also builds in exceptions and extensions—covering fraud, disability, acknowledgments, and other special circumstances—to mitigate hardship and foster substantial justice. Nonetheless, courts interpret its provisions strictly and literally, except where it explicitly allows relief (e.g., condonation under Section 5).


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