Doctrine of Eclipse in Indian Constitution

The Doctrine of Eclipse states that any law inconsistent with fundamental rights is not invalid. It is not dead but overshadowed by the fundamental right.

The inconsistency (conflict) can be removed by constitutional amendment. The amendment to the relevant fundamental right will remove the eclipse, and the entire law becomes valid.

What is the Doctrine of Eclipse?

The Doctrine of Eclipse is a legal principle in India that deals with the relationship between fundamental rights and existing laws that may be inconsistent with them. The Doctrine of Eclipse is addressed in Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution.

According to the doctrine of the eclipse, if a law conflicts with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution, it does not automatically become null and void. Instead, it is considered in a state of eclipse or overshadowed by fundamental rights.

If a statute is inconsistent with the provisions of Part III, it shall be deemed void. However, this does not render the entire law null and void under this doctrine; only the portion inconsistent with Part III of the Indian Constitution becomes void. The law is not abolished entirely but remains dormant, subject to the discretion of the Parliament.

The doctrine states that while such a law exists, its enforceability is restricted. It becomes unenforceable against citizens whose fundamental rights are violated by the law. However, it may remain applicable to non-citizens who are not entitled to the same fundamental rights. The doctrine does not entirely erase the law from the statute book but renders it dormant and ineffective as it violates fundamental rights.

The Doctrine of Eclipse allows for remedying the conflict between the law and fundamental rights through a constitutional amendment. Amending the relevant fundamental right removes the eclipse, and the entire law becomes valid and enforceable again.

Origin and Evolution of the Doctrine of Eclipse

Judicial review has played a significant role in establishing and shaping the doctrine of eclipse. While the formal pronouncement of this legal doctrine came in the case of Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Ors v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1955), traces of its origin can be found in previous cases.

Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh

The Supreme Court established the doctrine of the eclipse in the landmark case of Bhikhaji v. State of M.P., AIR 1955 S.C. 781. In this case, the provisions of the C.P. and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 1948 allowed the State Government to monopolise the motor transport business in the province, excluding other motor transport operators.

Although this provision was valid when enacted, it became void upon the commencement of the Constitution in 1950 as it violated Article 19(1)(g).

However, in 1951, Clause (6) of Article 19 was amended through the Constitution (1st Amendment Act) to authorise the government to establish a monopoly in any business. The Supreme Court determined that this amendment removed the shadow of unconstitutionality from the impugned Act, freeing it from any flaw or defect.

Once the constitutional impediment was removed, the law became enforceable against citizens and non-citizens. During the eclipse period, the law was temporarily suspended due to the conflict with fundamental rights. However, once the eclipse was removed, the law resumed its operation from the date of such removal.

One of the earliest cases where the doctrine of eclipse can be traced back is Keshava Madavan Menon v State of Bombay (1951). In this case, the appellant faced charges under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 for a pamphlet published in 1949. The appellant argued that the case against him could not be constituted as the pamphlet aligned with the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. 

However, the court opined that since the pamphlet was published before the existence of fundamental rights in the Indian Constitution, the appellant could not claim protection under them. This case established the prospective nature of fundamental rights, meaning they apply only from the time of their incorporation into the Constitution. Additionally, the court held that Article 13(1) is prospective in its application and does not have retrospective effect unless specifically stated otherwise.

Pannala Binaraj v. Union of India (1957)

The case of Pannala Binaraj v. Union of India (1957) reiterated the principle established in Keshava Madavan Menon. It upheld the prospective nature of Article 13(1) and highlighted that unless a statute expressly indicates retrospective application, it should be presumed to be prospective.

Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay (1955)

Another significant case that explored the nexus between Article 13(1) and the validation of pre-Constitutional laws infringing on fundamental rights was Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay (1955). The appellant in this case was charged under Section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, which pertained to driving under the influence of alcohol. 

The appellant relied on the earlier case of State of Bombay and Anr v. F.N. Balsara (1951), where Section 13(b) of the same Act was declared void to the extent that it applied to the use of alcoholic medicinal and toilet preparations, as it violated fundamental rights under Article 19. The appellant argued that by extension, Section 66(b) should also be considered void regarding alcoholic medicinal and toilet preparations.

Initially, the Supreme Court judges held that the Balsara case did not repeal or amend Section 66(b). However, upon reference to a larger constitutional bench, the majority opinion concluded that the section was “notionally obliterated” from the statute for the determination of rights and obligations of citizens. It was further established that the ruling in Balsara could serve as a valid defense to a charge under Section 66(b) concerning alcoholic medicinal and toilet preparations. 

The burden of proof was on the prosecution to demonstrate that the accused was driving under the influence of prohibited alcohol other than alcoholic medicinal preparations, and it was the accused’s responsibility to prove otherwise.

These cases highlight the role of judicial review in shaping the doctrine of eclipse, demonstrating the application of the doctrine to pre-Constitutional laws conflicting with fundamental rights and emphasizing the prospective nature of fundamental rights and Article 13(1) in Indian jurisprudence.

Application of the doctrine of the eclipse to the Indian Penal Code

In the case of P. Rathiram v. Union of India (1994), the constitutionality of Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalizes attempts to commit suicide, was challenged. The court held that Section 309 violated Article 19, which includes the right to freedom of speech and the right to remain silent. It was further argued that Section 309 was also in conflict with Article 21, which encompasses the right to life, including the right to choose not to live.

However, this ruling was later invalidated in the case of Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996). The court held that the right to life under Article 21 does not include the right to die by suicide. Therefore, the earlier decision in Rathiram case, which had eclipsed Section 309 with fundamental rights, was effectively nullified by the Gian judgment.

Elements of Doctrine of Eclipse

The Doctrine of Eclipse encompasses several key elements:

• Pre-constitutional law: The doctrine applies to laws enacted before the Constitution’s commencement.
• Conflict with fundamental rights: The law in question must directly conflict with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
• Inoperativeness rather than nullity: The law does not become wholly invalid or null and void. Instead, it becomes inoperative or unenforceable against citizens whose fundamental rights are violated by the law.
• Potential for future operativeness: If there is an amendment to the relevant fundamental right in the future, it automatically makes the previously impugned law operative again. This means that the law can be enforced and applied once the conflict with fundamental rights is resolved through a constitutional amendment.

Status of Post ConstitutionalLlaw under Article 13

Article 13(3) of the Indian Constitution prohibits the State from enacting any law that deprives or curtails the rights conferred by Part III, which pertains to fundamental rights. If the State passes a law inconsistent with or infringes upon Part III of the Constitution, it will be deemed ultra vires and void to the extent of its contravention with fundamental rights.

Such a law is stillborn and cannot be revived by removing the constitutional prohibition through a subsequent amendment to the Constitution. Even if the constitutional prohibition is removed, the law remains invalid. To establish the invalidity of post-constitution laws that are inconsistent with fundamental rights, a declaration by the court is necessary.

Does the Doctrine of Eclipse apply to Post Constitutional Law?

The doctrine of eclipse applies to pre-constitutional laws but not to post-constitutional laws. The case of Deep Chand v. State of U.P. established that a post-constitutional law made under Article 13(2) that contradicts a fundamental right is null and void from its inception, making it a stillborn law. It is considered void ab initio.

However, in the case of the State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills case, the Supreme Court modified its previous stance as expressed in the Deep Chand and Mahendra Lal Jain cases. It stated that a post-constitutional law inconsistent with fundamental rights is not always a nullity or nonexistent for all purposes. The court acknowledged that in some cases, such a law may still have certain limited operative aspects, even if it violates fundamental rights.

Therefore, while the doctrine of eclipse primarily applies to pre-constitutional laws, the exact status and consequences of post-constitutional laws inconsistent with fundamental rights may vary depending on the specific circumstances and interpretation by the courts.

Exception to Post Constitutional law

According to the Indian Constitution, fundamental rights are primarily available to citizens. Therefore, if a post-constitutional law infringes upon or curtails the rights conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution, it will still be operative with regard to non-citizens. Non-citizens are not entitled to the same fundamental rights as citizens, so the law will not be void or non-existent.

The provision of voidness mentioned in Article 13(2) applies only to persons whose fundamental rights are infringed or abridged by the law. It does not extend to non-citizens who do not possess those fundamental rights. Non-citizens cannot avail themselves of the protection provided under Article 13(2) because it specifically relates to violating fundamental rights granted exclusively to citizens.

Hence, a post-constitution law that takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Article 19 of the Indian Constitution will remain operative in relation to non-citizens. At the same time, its voidness or non-existence will apply only to citizens whose fundamental rights are affected by the law.

Conclusion

The doctrine validates pre-constitution laws that violate the fundamental rights provided under Part III of the Indian Constitution. Instead of being declared null and void from the beginning, these laws are considered unenforceable and in a state of dormancy only to the extent of their inconsistency with fundamental rights.

However, if the Parliament makes a subsequent amendment to the Constitution, removing the inconsistency or conflict between the existing law and the fundamental rights, the eclipse disappears. Once the inconsistency is resolved, the particular law becomes active and enforceable.

In essence, the doctrine of eclipse provides a mechanism for temporarily suspending pre-constitution laws that violate fundamental rights while allowing for their revival and validity through constitutional amendments that remove the inconsistency.