10th Schedule of Constitution

The 10th Schedule of the Indian Constitution contains the Anti-Defection Law, which was introduced to address the growing problem of political defections in India. Defection, in the constitutional sense, refers to the act of an elected representative abandoning the political party on whose ticket the person was elected, usually for personal, political, or financial gain. Such actions weaken democratic values, distort the mandate of voters, and often lead to instability in governments.

To control this practice and preserve the integrity of the electoral process, the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985 inserted the 10th Schedule into the Constitution. The Schedule lays down clear rules for disqualification of Members of Parliament and State Legislatures on grounds of defection, while also providing certain limited exceptions.

Historical Background of the 10th Schedule

The issue of political defections became particularly serious in the late 1960s and 1970s. After the general elections of 1967, several State Governments collapsed due to frequent party-switching by legislators. The phrase “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram” became symbolic of this political instability, referring to repeated defections by elected representatives within short periods.

Recognising the seriousness of the problem, Parliament constituted a committee under the chairmanship of Y.B. Chavan to examine the issue of defections. The committee recommended constitutional measures to discourage this practice. 

Although earlier attempts to introduce constitutional amendments failed due to dissolution of the Lok Sabha, the matter was finally addressed in 1985 when the Rajiv Gandhi government enacted the 52nd Constitutional Amendment. This amendment introduced the Anti-Defection Law in the form of the 10th Schedule.

Relationship with Articles 102(2) and 191(2)

Along with adding the 10th Schedule, the 52nd Amendment also inserted clause (2) in Article 102 and Article 191 of the Constitution.

• Article 102 deals with disqualification of Members of Parliament.
  
• Article 191 deals with disqualification of Members of State Legislatures.

Clause (2) of both these Articles states that a person shall be disqualified if disqualified under the 10th Schedule. This gives constitutional backing to the Anti-Defection Law and makes the provisions of the Schedule enforceable.

Structure and Scope of the 10th Schedule

The 10th Schedule is divided into eight paragraphs. Each paragraph deals with a specific aspect of defection and disqualification.

Paragraph 1: Definitions

Paragraph 1 serves as the interpretation clause of the Schedule. It defines important terms such as:

• House: Refers to either House of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly or Council of a State.
• Legislature Party: A group consisting of all members of a House belonging to a particular political party.
• Original Political Party: The political party to which a member belonged at the time of election.

These definitions help in applying the provisions of the Schedule uniformly.

Paragraph 2: Grounds of Disqualification

Paragraph 2 forms the core of the Anti-Defection Law. It specifies the circumstances under which a member can be disqualified.

Members of a Political Party

A member belonging to a political party becomes disqualified if:

• The member voluntarily gives up membership of the political party, or
• The member votes or abstains from voting in the House contrary to the direction issued by the political party (whip), without prior permission, and such action is not condoned by the party within 15 days.

The expression “voluntarily gives up membership” has been interpreted broadly by courts and includes conduct indicating abandonment of party loyalty, even without formal resignation.

Independent Members

An independent candidate is disqualified if the member joins any political party after being elected. This provision ensures that independent candidates respect the mandate on which they were elected.

Nominated Members

Nominated members are given a limited relaxation. They may join a political party within six months from the date of taking oath. If a nominated member joins a political party after this six-month period, disqualification follows.

Paragraph 3 and the 91st Constitutional Amendment

Originally, Paragraph 3 allowed disqualification to be avoided in cases of party splits, provided at least one-third of the members formed a separate group. This provision was widely misused to legitimise mass defections.

To address this loophole, the Constitution (Ninety-First Amendment) Act, 2003 deleted Paragraph 3 entirely. The Amendment also introduced Articles 75(1B) and 164(1B), which disqualify defectors from holding ministerial positions at both the Centre and State levels. This significantly strengthened the Anti-Defection framework.

Paragraph 4: Merger of Political Parties

Paragraph 4 provides an exception in cases of mergers. A merger is considered valid if at least two-thirds of the members of the legislature party agree to merge with another political party.

Members who do not accept the merger and choose to function as a separate group are also protected from disqualification. This provision recognises collective political realignments while discouraging individual opportunistic defections.

Paragraph 5: Exemption for Presiding Officers

The Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chairman, or Deputy Chairman of a House are exempted from disqualification if they give up party membership upon election to such office. Rejoining a political party after demitting office is also permitted.

This exemption is intended to ensure neutrality of the Presiding Officer while discharging constitutional functions.

Paragraph 6: Authority to Decide Disqualification

Paragraph 6 vests the power to decide questions of disqualification in the Speaker or Chairman of the House. If the disqualification of the Speaker or Chairman is in question, the House appoints another member to decide the issue.

This provision has been one of the most debated aspects of the 10th Schedule, primarily due to concerns regarding political bias and delay.

Paragraph 7: Bar on Court Jurisdiction

Paragraph 7 seeks to bar the jurisdiction of courts in matters relating to disqualification under the Schedule. However, this provision has been read down by judicial interpretation, allowing limited judicial review in appropriate cases.

Paragraph 8: Rule-Making Power

Paragraph 8 empowers the Speaker or Chairman to make rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Schedule. It also allows the Presiding Officer to treat deliberate violation of these rules as a breach of privilege of the House.

Constitutional Validity of the 10th Schedule

The constitutional validity of the 10th Schedule was challenged in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992). The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Schedule while making important observations.

The Court held that:

• The Anti-Defection Law serves a legitimate constitutional purpose.
• The power of judicial review under Article 136, Article 226, and Article 227 is not completely excluded.
• Decisions of the Speaker or Chairman are subject to judicial review after they are made.

The Court also held that restrictions on freedom of speech of legislators were justified in the larger national interest of maintaining political stability.

Conclusion

The 10th Schedule of the Indian Constitution represents a significant attempt to protect democratic values by discouraging political defections. By laying down clear rules for disqualification and limiting opportunistic party-switching, the Anti-Defection Law seeks to preserve the mandate of voters and ensure stability in governance.

However, the effectiveness of the law depends largely on impartial enforcement and timely decision-making. Judicial interventions and constitutional amendments have strengthened the framework, but unresolved challenges remain. Continuous evaluation and reform are essential to ensure that the 10th Schedule fulfils its constitutional purpose in both letter and spirit.